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to prevent granting relief in a case where claimant adheres to his
contract and seeks arbitration. The sections apparently do not forbid provisional remedies where the claimant goes to court first in
contradiction of his agreement to arbitrate.
CPLR 7503(c).: Conflict as to service resolved in second
department.
Under CPLR 7502 a special proceeding is used to bring before
a court the first application arising out of an arbitrable controversy
which is not made by motion in a pending action. After a notice
of intention to arbitrate is served, CPLR 7503(c), allows an application to stay the arbitration to be served. A conflict has arisen
as to whether the application to stay may be served on the attorney
named in the notice of intention to arbitrate or whether it must be
served on a party.
Matter of Bauer,'5 7 a fourth department case, held that service has to be made on a party. Appis v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,15 a Westchester County case, held that the claimant's attorney was designated as his representative in the notice of
intention to arbitrate and therefore service by certified mail on the
attorney was within the intendment of 7503(c).
In Statewide Insurance Co. v. Lopez, 59 the appellate division,
second department, has resolved the conflict for its own department
by holding that service must be made upon a party. The court
explained that while under the CPA arbitration was itself a special
proceeding, commenced when a notice to arbitrate was served, such
is no longer the case. Today, if there is no action pending, a
special proceeding must be initiated to bring before a court the first
application arising out of an arbitrable controversy. Since, as a
general rule, initiatory process must be served upon the party over
whom jurisdiction is sought, service upon his attorney was deemed
a jurisdictional defect.
GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW

GML § 50-i:

Construed in a wrongful death action.

Section 67 of the Town Law provides that any claim against
a town "for damages for wrong or injury to person or property or
for the death of a person" must be made and served in compliance
'57 55 Misc. 2d 991, 287 N.Y.S2d 206 (Sup. Ct. Wyoming County 1968);
see The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 43 ST. J HN's L. REv.
302, 344-45 (1968).
15856 Misc. 2d 969, 290 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1968).
25930 App. Div. 2d 694, 291 N.Y.S2d 928 (2d Dep't 1968).
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

with section 50-e of the General Municipal Law and an action upon
the claim must be commenced pursuant to section 50-i of that law.
Section 50-e provides for notice of claim to be given within
ninety days after the claim arises. Two wrongful death cases,
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, have held that the period for
filing a notice of claim in such an action begins to run from
the time of the appointment of an estate representative. 16 0 Section 50-i provides that an action must be commenced within
one year and ninety days "after the happening of the event upon
which the claim is based." This section has been recently construed
in a wrongful death action.
In Erickson v. Town of Henderson,'61 plaintiff's intestate died
due to the alleged negligence of the defendant town. The administrator was appointed five days short of the second anniversary of
the intestate's death. Four days after the appointment, the notice
of claim and summons and complaint were served on the town
clerk. The town's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was
denied and the town appealed.
The appellate division, fourth department, reversed, holding
that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the wrongful death
action because, although the notice of claim was timely filed in
accordance with section 50-e and applicable case law, the action
was not commenced in accordance with section 50-i, i.e., within one
year and ninety days from the happening of the event upon which
the claim was based. The court did not see any anomaly in holding
that the notice of claim was timely while the summons and complaint served at the same time was not.
Although the decision in the instant case is justified by a literal interpretation of section 50-i, it is difficult to accept this effective emasculation of previous case law which construed the notice
of claim period to begin at the time an administrator is appointed.

16o Joseph v. McVeigh, 285 App. Div. 386, 137 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1st Dep't
1955), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 877, 131 N.E2d 289 (1956); Buduson v. Curtis, 285
App. Div. 517, 139 N.Y.S.2d 392 (4th Dep't 1955), affd, 309 N.Y. 879, 131
N.E.2d 290 (1956).
Is6 30 App. Div. 2d 282, 291 N.Y.S2d 403 (4th Dep't 1968).

